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I. INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation in December of 2001
"sent shock waves throughout the country" that forced both Wall
Street and the average investor to rethink our system of corporate
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governance.1 WorldCom, the second-largest long distance carrier in
the United States, topped Enron by filing an even larger bankruptcy
in 2002 with pre-petition assets estimated at a staggering
$103,914,000,000.2 Although these were two of the largest bankruptcy
filings in United States history, Enron and WorldCom were merely the
tip of the iceberg. Similar scandals at Adelphia Communications,
Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, HealthSouth, Qwest, Rite Aid,
Tyco, and Xerox represent "a national deluge of corporate
malfeasance."3 "The particulars of each case are unique, but certain
elements remain constant: massive accounting fraud, insider trading,
influence-peddling, dubious tax avoidance schemes, outrageous perks
for insiders, and complicity by overcompensated directors."
4
"Over half of American families now invest directly or
indirectly in the stock market."5 When companies such as Enron and
WorldCom go bankrupt, it is the stockholders of these corporations
who generally stand to lose the most as residual claimants of
economically moribund corporations. "In the three years since the
[Enron and Worldcom] scandals broke, nearly one thousand publicly
held corporations restated their finances in order to stave off lawsuits,
triggering a staggering seven trillion dollar devaluation in the stock
markets."6
How, then, can our system of corporate governance be
reformed-a system that has allowed officers and directors of
corporations to perpetrate fraud so pervasive as to send some of
America's largest corporations into bankruptcy? Although the public
has looked largely to lawmakers to achieve corporate reform, other
entities have undertaken reform as well. These reforms include
increased scrutiny of corporate directors' actions, 7  bolstered
requirements calling for boards of directors of companies listed on the
1. S. REP. No. 107-70, at 2 (2002) (reporting on the role of the board of directors in Enron's
collapse).
2. The Largest Bankruptcies 1980-Present, http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/
15-largest.htm (last visited May 31, 2006).
3. Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1957, 1957 (2004).
4. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 811 (2004).
5. S. REP. No. 107-70, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Litowitz, supra note 4, at 811 (emphasis added) (citing Bill Deener, Cost to Stay Public
Soars for Small Companies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2003, at D1 ("About $7 trillion in
market capitalization is gone," said House of Representatives Financial Services Committee
Spokesperson Peggy Peterson.)).
7. Jeffrey D. Hern, Comment, Delaware Courts' Delicate Response to the Corporate
Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of
Corporations, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 228-29 (2005).
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NYSE and NASDAQ to be more independent,8 and a higher degree of
scrutiny from state agencies.9 The reform has primarily focused on
correcting loopholes exploited by companies like Enron and WorldCom
to perpetuate fraud. 10 What the reform has not done, however, is
change our system of corporate governance in a way that allows
corporate constituencies to monitor or address wrongdoing by
management before damage is done to a corporation.
True reform to our system of corporate governance is best
directed at the state level: "In our federal system of corporate law,
state governments set the rules governing the relationships among the
primary participants in the corporate enterprise: directors, officers
and investors."1 States have the ability to enact statutes and develop
common law that can be characterized as stockholder, management,
or even creditor-friendly. Yet, perverse incentives may hamper states'
efforts in achieving meaningful corporate governance reform.
Traditional scholarship asserts that our system of corporate
governance is largely a product of competition between states that
were either in a "race to the bottom"1 2 or a "race to the top" 13 in terms
of establishing systems of corporate governance designed to attract a
greater number of corporate charters. These corporate charters are
attractive to states because corporations pay franchise taxes and other
fees to the states in which they incorporate, generating important tax
revenue. 14 "Race to the bottom" theorists posit that our system of
corporate governance is biased in favor of corporate management. 15
8. And Now, The Independent Director! Have Congress, the NYSE, and NASDAQ Finally
Figured Out How to Make the Independent Director Actually Work?, in Colloquium, Developments
& the Law: Corporations & Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2181, 2195 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1077 (2003) ("On December 20 2002, the SEC and
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced that they had reached an agreement in
principle with various SROs and state regulatory authorities to reform investment practices.").
10. See Erica Gann, Comment, Judicial Action in Retrograde: The Case for Applying Section
804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to All Fraud Actions Under the Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1043, 1045 (2004) (citing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stating that it "sought to cover any possible
legal loopholes that would permit corporate fraud").
11. Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29
IOWA J. CORP. L. 625, 630 (2004).
12. For the classic formulation of the "race to the bottom" theory, see William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
13. For the traditional response to the "race to the bottom" theory, describing the "race to
the top," see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
14. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 306 (1997) (stating that one of the reasons why states compete for corporate
charters is to "producen franchise tax revenues").
15. Cary, supra note 12, at 670-72.
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"Race to the top" proponents argue that the corporate-stockholder
relationship is defined by the market, bringing the relationship into a
natural equilibrium. 16
Although this debate has ebbed and flowed, what is not
debatable is where the vast majority of corporate charters are held.
Delaware is the state of choice for incorporation, as shown by the fact
that nearly 400,000 American corporations are chartered there.
17
57.75 percent of all publicly-traded corporations and 59 percent of the
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware.18 Because a
significant number of the 42.25 percent of public corporations that are
not incorporated in Delaware are chartered in the state where their
headquarters are located, the true measure of Delaware's preeminence
in corporate law should focus on the proportion of corporate charters
Delaware captures from corporations which do not charter in their
home state. 19 Delaware incorporates a commanding 85 percent of all
such corporations. 20 "Delaware is thus a virtual monopoly in the out-
of-state incorporations market .... "21
Further evidence of this "virtual monopoly" is the fact that the
15 percent of corporations which do incorporate outside the state of
their headquarters, but do not incorporate within Delaware, actually
do not concentrate in any one state.22 Of the 216 Fortune 500
companies which incorporate outside of the state of their
headquarters, no "state [other than Delaware] captures even 10 such
corporations."23  Non-Fortune 500 companies exhibit a similar
incorporation pattern. For the non-Fortune 500 group, over a similar
time period "Delaware capture[d] about 3744 out-of-state
incorporations of publicly traded companies, [while] each other state
attract[ed] fewer than 180 such incorporations. '" 24 Not only does
Delaware dominate the market for out-of-state incorporations, but its
16. Winter, supra note 13, at 256.
17. Marc Gunther, Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 172, 176.
18. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 568 (2002).
19. Id. at 568-74 (discussing the "home state" bias exhibited by many corporations and
discussing possible reasons for it, including increased transaction costs for incorporating out of
state and corporations' hopes to receive more favorable treatment in their home states).
20. Id. at 555-56.
21. Id. at 556.
22. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,
1573-74 (2002) (noting that "no state has had any meaningful success in attracting out-of-state
firms going public" and stating that Delaware's most aggressive competitor, Nevada, failed to
capture more than one percent of all firms that went public between 1990 and 1997).
23. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 18, at 556 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen,




market share is growing and this trend shows signs of continuing. 25
Whether it is a race to the top or a race to the bottom, Delaware is the
clear winner in the race for corporate charters.
Thus, in the wake of the recent wave of corporate scandals, not
only should Delaware provide answers to the question of why the
scandals occurred, but it should also provide long-term solutions to the
problem. The lack of competition for out-of-state corporate charters,
however, may mean that Delaware's legislature lacks the necessary
incentives to innovate its corporate governance system.
Notwithstanding this lack of incentives, recent scholarship has
suggested two main vehicles through which corporate reform may be
achieved. The first avenue focuses on reliance on Delaware itself,
arguing that backlash from the wake of recent scandals is sufficient to
prompt Delaware to make reforms in order to maintain dominance in
the collection of corporate charters.26 The second avenue relies on an
increased form of competition between Delaware and the federal
government to effectuate corporate reform.27
The scope of this Note is limited to first, evaluating corporate
reform initiated by Delaware and, next, exploring another avenue for
corporate reform which focuses on preventing corporate wrongdoing,
rather than simply redressing it. Part II of this Note takes brief
inventory of how Delaware is reacting to the corporate wrongdoing
that began in 2001 and concludes that neither its judiciary, nor its
legislature, is likely to make meaningful changes to its system of
corporate governance. Part III will focus on how realigning the
corporate-stockholder relationship may achieve corporate governance
reform. Part IV will first evaluate a recent decision by Delaware's
Chancery Court which had the opportunity to realign one narrow
aspect the corporate-stockholder relationship through Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 220, and then present an
alternative manner in which courts could review similar cases in the
future. Part V will conclude by commenting on the feasibility of
implementing the suggested change.
25. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 23, at 386-87.
26. See, e.g., Carl W. Mills, Note, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud: SEC v.
Chancellor Corp., 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 439, 464 (2005) (stating that despite the
federalization of certain parts of corporate law, "Delaware remains in a position to play a
significant role in the regulation of director conduct").
27. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (detailing how
increased federalism of corporate law is creating a form of "competition" between the federal
government and Delaware for control of America's system of corporate governance).
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II. RELIANCE ON DELAWARE FOR CORPORATE REFORM
Any discussion of reform of Delaware corporate law requires an
understanding of Delaware's unique position with respect to corporate
law and the resulting advantages derived from hosting the corporate
charters of so many U.S. corporations. No other state derives such a
large proportion of its budgeted revenues from corporations chartered
within its borders as does Delaware. 28 Consequently, any changes to
the corpus of Delaware corporate law will most likely be tempered to
ensure that current charters will not leave the state. If history is a
guide, any changes to its law will also be fashioned such that new
corporations will not be deterred from entering the state.
29
At the very least, one must concede that Delaware is more than
an impartial observer when it comes to the corpus of the corporate law
which it promulgates. Critics assert that the "'public policy of the
State' [is] to adopt legal rules that [corporate] managers desire.
'"3O
Others argue that in order to maintain its legitimacy and preferred
status as home to the largest corporations in the United States, the
judiciary of Delaware must crack down on corporate mismanagement
to protect stockholders. 31 An evaluation of changes that Delaware has
made to its corporate law since 2001 demonstrates that Delaware has
not made sufficient changes in its system of corporate governance to
prevent corporate wrongdoing before it occurs.
A. Response of Delaware's Judiciary to Corporate Scandals After 2001
In reference to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act") of 2002 32,
the Chief Justice of Delaware's Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey,
stated, "If we don't fix it, Congress will, but I hope they've gone as far
as they're going to have to go." 33 There is perhaps no better evidence
28. Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 127, 159-60 (2004).
29. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 890 n.11 (1990) (citing Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985), and stating that Delaware is one of
the most responsive states in terms of incorporating changes into its corporate law that attract
corporate charters).
30. Jones, supra note 11, at 630 (citing Cary, supra note 12, at 663).
31. Id. at 629 (stating that "[t]he realistic threat of federal preemption posed by Sarbanes-
Oxley seems to have influenced Delaware's judiciary").
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 114 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 14, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
33. Colloquium, What's Wrong with Executive Compensation? A Roundtable Moderated by




than this statement to demonstrate that the Delaware judiciary is
aware of the need to achieve corporate reform in the wake of recent
corporate scandals. It is telling that the quote does not focus on the
plight of the stockholder as much as it focuses on maintaining
Delaware's "legitimacy and power in the realm of corporate law."
3 4
Since the Enron debacle of 2001, some have argued that Delaware's
judiciary has made a noticeable shift in how it evaluates allegations of
corporate malfeasance. 35  Scholars argue that the shift has been
toward holding board members accountable for conduct detrimental to
stockholders. This supposed shift is held out as evidence of reform to
our system of corporate governance.
Specifically, In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation
36
has been heralded by scholars as a paradigm shift by Delaware's
judiciary-"a shift ... from allowing independence [of board members]
to enforcing oversight of their actions."37  The case involved a
stockholder action brought in response to a severance package given to
the now-former president of the Walt Disney Company, Michael
Ovitz. 38 After little more than a year of employment the board
determined that Ovitz should no longer serve as president of the Walt
Disney Company. As a result, he received a severance package
allegedly valued at over $140 million.
39
The decision to hire Ovitz was made "unilaterally" by Michael
Eisner, Disney's CEO, who happened to be "a close friend [of Ovitz's]
for over twenty-five years."40 Prior to joining Disney, Ovitz had never
held a position as "an executive for a publicly owned entertainment
company," but was the founder and head of his own talent agency.
41
During the course of Eisner's pursuit of Ovitz for the position of
president, Eisner sent Ovitz a letter setting out the material terms of
Ovitz's prospective employment with the company. 42 Neither Disney's
board of directors nor its compensation committee met to discuss
hiring Ovitz as the new president of Disney before Eisner sent this
letter.43
34. Jones, supra note 11, at 627.
35. Id. at 643 (stating that "Delaware's judiciary has taken the initiative to reform its
state's corporate law in an effort to forestall further federal preemption").
36. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
37. Hern, supra note 7, at 216.
38. In Re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 278-79.
39. Id.






After Eisner sent the letter, Disney's board of directors failed to
commit significant resources to deliberating over Ovitz's compensation
package before approving it. Disney's compensation committee, which
consisted of three board members, met for only one hour to discuss
Ovitz's compensation package. 44 At this meeting, the directors also
discussed two other subjects which dominated the conversation for
nearly the entire meeting. 45 The committee did not even receive a
copy of the draft agreement of Ovitz's employment contract prior to
the meeting. Instead, the committee relied on an incomplete
summary of the agreement that lacked pertinent data necessary to
evaluate the fairness of Ovitz's employment contract.
46
Notwithstanding its lack of involvement and investigation, the
compensation committee approved Ovitz's compensation package.
Approval by the Disney board of directors came later that day without
the availability of more detailed information providing the precise
terms of Ovitz's employment contract.
47
Despite alleging these seemingly damaging facts in their
complaint, the plaintiffs' case was dismissed by Delaware's Chancery
Court. 48 The dismissal was no shock, however, to commentators and
those familiar with Delaware law. - Board action with respect to
executive compensation had long since fallen under the umbrella of
the business judgment rule49 and was well within the realm of
decisions which courts allow board members to make under that
doctrine.50 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and
remanded the case on appeal with instructions for the Chancery Court
to allow the plaintiffs to redraft portions of their initial complaint. 51
44. Id. at 280.
45. Id.
46. Hern, supra note 7, at 217 n.69:
The summary did not include the following: Ovitz's exercise price for five million
shares of stock options, any document showing the potential payout to Ovitz, any
document showing the possible cost of Ovitz's severance package upon a non-fault
termination, or any comparisons with employment agreements of similarly-situated
executives in the entertainment industry.
47. In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 281.
48. In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998).
49. The business judgment rule is perhaps best articulated in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984), where the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the business judgment rule
is "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."
50. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) ("Where waste of corporate
assets is alleged, the court['s examination] ... is limited solely to discovering whether what the
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid.").
51. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000).
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Upon remand, the Chancery Court held that the plaintiffs' amended
complaint was sufficient to withstand Disney's motion for dismissal,
and the case was allowed to proceed to trial.
Scholars have used the In re Disney decision and others as
evidence of a paradigm shift in Delaware's judiciary away from
unflinching adherence to the principles of the business judgment rule,
which defer overwhelmingly to management. Other cases that
supposedly provide evidence of this shift include In re Oracle
Corporation2 and In re Abbott Laboratories,53 both of which applied
Delaware law.54 In both cases, just as in In re Disney, the courts
would not dismiss the plaintiffs' complaints on the pleadings alone.55
At best, these cases may be evidence of a tightening of standards after
the recent wave of corporate scandals. These cases cannot, however,
be viewed as wholesale victories for the plaintiffs because each case
simply allowed the proceedings to continue toward trial.56
Further proceedings in all three of these cases suggest that
Delaware's judiciary has not made a meaningful shift in the level of
scrutiny applied to alleged instances of corporate mismanagement. In
re Walt Disney concluded in August of 2005, with the defendants
prevailing on all counts.5 7 The In re Oracle litigation also has arrived
at its final resting place-summary judgment in favor of the CEO and
CFO.58 Although the final outcome is less clear, In re Abbott appears
to be headed toward a similar result. In In re Abbot, just as in In re
Oracle, after denying the defendant's initial motion for dismissal, the
52. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
53. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
54. See Hern, supra note 7, at 229; In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 795; In re Oracle Corp.,
824 A.2d at 917 (applying Delaware law).
55. In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 948; In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 811.
56. See sources cited supra note 55.
57. In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). The Court of Chancery made eight findings:
(1) [Ovitz] did not breach duty of loyalty to corporation when president accepted non-
fault termination package upon termination by rEisneri; (2) termination of [Ovitzl and
payment of non-fault termination benefits did not constitute waste; (3) [Eisner acted
in good faith and was not grossly negligent so as to breach his fiduciary duty of care
when he negotiated with and hired [Ovitz[; (4) chairman of corporation's
compensation committee was not grossly negligent and did not act in bad faith when
he negotiated with and hired [Ovitz]; (5) compensation committee member who helped
design compensation package and employment agreement did not breach fiduciary
duty of care or act in anything other than in good faith; (6) board of directors was not
under a duty to act with respect to termination of [Ovitzl; (7) general counsel acted in
good faith when he advised [Eisner] with respect to termination; and (8) [Eisner]
acted in accordance with his fiduciary duties and in good faith when he terminated
[Ovitz].
58. 867 A.2d 904, 955 (Del. Ch. 2004).
2006] 1391
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court eventually decided the case in the defendant's favor on summary
judgment. 59 On appeal, however, In re Abbot has been reversed and
remanded and the district court will have the chance again to see the
case proceed toward trial or end on summary judgment. 60 Proceeding
toward trial has been a lengthy and expensive process as the
defendant's various pretrial motions have slowed down the trial
process. Motions for a rehearing, 61 bifurcation of discovery,62 and a
hearing to address objections to a magistrate judge's ruling compelling
discovery of certain documents63 have all been made by the
defendants, slowing the process toward trial and increasing the cost of
litigation for both parties. Although in all three of these cases the
outcome has been favorable to the plaintiffs at some intermediate
point, if history is any guide, the ultimate outcomes will be uniformly
disappointing. Thus, the practical effect of courts denying initial
motions to dismiss has been that the plaintiffs have paid more
lawyers' fees for unfavorable results. Winning a few minor battles
simply cannot be seen as a true shift in paradigm when the outcome of
the war remains the same.
1. Institutional Constraints of the Judiciary
Early speculation that the above cases were strong evidence of
a shift in Delaware's judiciary toward a more stockholder-friendly
model of corporate governance was misplaced. There is simply no
hard evidence that Delaware's judiciary is, already has, or is poised to,
increase its scrutiny of decisions made by corporate boards in the
wake of recent corporate mismanagement. Continued stockholder
abuse64 by corporate managers suggests that any changes which have
been made so far are insufficient to root out corporate wrongdoing.
This failure, however, may not be the fault of the judiciary itself, but
rather, of the paradigm within which the judiciary works.
The judiciary is the final arbiter of disputes. It inherently
lacks the ability to prospectively change the rules which apply to our
59. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 798-99.
60. Id. at 811.
61. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., No. 01-1952, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10628,
at *1 (7th Cir. May 27, 2003).
62. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., No. 99 C 7246, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16032, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003).
63. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., No. 99 C 7246, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5451
(N.D. Ill. March 29, 2004).
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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system of corporate governance due to the doctrine of ripeness.6 5 A
prospective solution is necessary to stop corporate wrongdoing at its
earliest stages before stockholders are defrauded and lose the value of
their investments. Even if the judiciary (which oversaw the system of
corporate governance that allowed for the Enron and WorldCom
debacles), 66 could be trusted to achieve meaningful reform, it could not
achieve this without first allowing more wrongs to occur. Reliance on
the judiciary as a vehicle for achieving corporate reform is simply
inefficient.
Reliance on a reactionary judiciary to achieve corporate
governance reform would' create other problems as well. Ex ante
certainty would be undermined if judicial opinions, which should
achieve finality and thus certainty for our system, change at the
demands of the public or other constituencies. 67 Delaware has not
always been a perfect model of ex ante certainty, and the tendency of
Delaware courts to change their interpretations of the law has led
some scholars to suggest that Delaware law is indeterminate in
certain areas. For example, one such scholar suggested that
"Delaware courts are famous for announcing new standards of
conduct, while claiming that such standards have always existed."68
Evidence that Delaware courts do not produce perfect ex ante
certainty, however, does not mean that Delaware would not be
harmed if the judiciary further exacerbated this problem.
65. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153, 155,
161 (1987) (elaborating on the "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of the Constitution
and explaining that the ripeness doctrine is essentially part of "actionability analysis"-that is, a
determination of "whether a litigant has stated a claim on which relief can be granted"); see also
Harold J. Krent, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F.
85, 92-93 (2001) (noting that "causation and redressability constitute independent requirements
a litigant must meet to satisfy standing under Article III"). Properly understood, the doctrine of
ripeness simply restricts parties from filing claims when they have not yet suffered a concrete
harm.
66. Although neither Enron nor WorldCom were incorporated within the state of Delaware,
any argument that Delaware's system of corporate governance is not implicated by the scandals
would ignore the reality of our national system of corporate governance. Virtually all states have
established enabling statutes that follow Delaware's lead, and most other state courts look to
Delaware for legal precedent with respect to corporate law. Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy:
The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 87
(1990) (referring to Delaware law as "our national corporate law"); Jones, supra note 11, at 654
n.200.
67. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Management, Shareholders, and Stakeholders, 36 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 519,
524-25 (1992) (discussing the trend of Delaware courts during the 1980s and stating that the
judiciary began the decade by questioning the breadth of the business judgment rule as it
applied to managerial choices, yet later eroded stockholders' "protection from management's
defensive tactics aimed at defeating hostile offers and preventing future unwanted advances").
68. Jones, supra note 11, at 645, 645 n.126.
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Reliance on the judiciary for corporate reform essentially
transforms judges into legislators. Notwithstanding one
commentator's observation that there are "extremely and unusually
close links between the Delaware Legislature and the judiciary," the
line between the two should not be further blurred.69 Allowing judges
to assume a legislative role is unsound because the judiciary is
insulated from the political process. The judiciary is an anti-
majoritarian body and is appointed, rather than elected. 70 It is
fundamental to our system of government that the people of our
nation elect those who make the law. 71 This is true at both the
national and state levels where the political process serves as a check
on the powers of our lawmaking bodies. To entrust the judiciary with
the task of reforming our system of corporate governance is to entrust
it with a task for which it is ill-equipped and not intended to fulfill.
Additionally, changes made by the judiciary which are initiated due to
popular pressure could easily be reversed when the political winds
subside. It follows that reform involving the judiciary should be
limited to instances when the court's actions are benign, removing
obstacles or interpreting existing statutes in a manner that will allow
other corporate actors to act as permanent checks to corporate
wrongdoing. Such change would not rely on the judiciary to make law,
only to enforce it.
B. Response of Delaware's Legislature to Corporate Scandals After
2001
To date, Delaware's legislature has done very little to prevent
the reoccurrence of the abuses that caused the Enron and WorldCom
scandals. The largest change to corporate law instituted by
Delaware's legislature was a series of laws passed in 2003 that
expanded the Chancery Court's jurisdiction to assist some classes of
plaintiffs in bringing actions against officers of corporations. 72 A
simple channeling of more lawsuits into the judiciary, however, cannot
achieve meaningful corporate reform because simply allowing more
lawsuits to begin suffers from the same procedural and institutional
defects described in the previous section. The new laws further
69. Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Proposed Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law: A
Horse Designed by Committee, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 437, 442 (1986).
70. Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 5 DEL. L.
REV. 115, 121 (2002).
71. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).




entrench a reactionary system designed to punish past deeds and only
theoretically to deter future ones; the laws fail to provide a corporate
constituency with the ability to prevent mismanagement as it occurs.
In short, Delaware's legislature has taken a passive role, bolstering
the judiciary's ability to hear cases while leaving in place the legal
framework which led to corporate disasters.
III. INCREASED STOCKHOLDER OVERSIGHT
Structural deficiencies of the judiciary and lack of action by
Delaware's legislature should prompt corporate reformers to seek
alternative avenues of change. Because of the lack of permanence of
common law and the prevalence of corporate lobbyists who could erect
barriers to new legislation, 73 true corporate reform is most likely to
occur only in the absence of continued reliance on the judiciary or
massive new legislation. Such reform remains necessary despite
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because the Act is deficient in the
same way as the modestly changed Delaware corporate law.
Specifically, the Act fails to alter the corporate-stockholder
relationship and focuses reform on increased monitoring and
enhanced punishment for abuse of that relationship. 74 Generally
speaking, recent reform both from Delaware and the federal
government is not a step in a new direction, but more of the same.
Instead of altering pecuniary incentives for the stockholder and the
manager, recent reforms introduce a larger role for government
monitoring of private interests, seeking to appease the stockholder by
appearing to frighten the corporate manager into compliance with the
law.
Unfortunately, these reforms address only one side of the
equation, wholly ignoring the potential role of the stockholder in
corporate monitoring. Instead of untying the hands of stockholders
who are prevented, often statutorily, from monitoring corporate
management, reforms such as Sarbanes-Oxley and recent Delaware
legislation 75 have only increased the "surveillance and control of the
market and the firm by government in the name, and on behalf, of the
73. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000)
(discussing the general workings of government regulation and the role interest groups play in
shaping most legislation).
74. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 32, at tits. I, II, and IV (discussing the
enhanced disclosure requirements); id. at tits. III, VII, IX, and XI (discussing enhanced
"responsibilities" and new liability attached to corporate wrongdoing).
75. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 32; see also Jones, supra note 11, at 644
n.115 (citing 18 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 185, 185-86 (June 18, 2003)).
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private stakeholders traditionally charged with the development and
protection of their economic arrangements."
76
Our system of corporate governance should not continue to
substitute government oversight (federal or state) for stockholder
oversight since it is the stockholder who suffers discrete and personal
harm from corporate mismanagement. The corporate-stockholder
relationship's equilibrium, as it existed prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and
the recent changes to Delaware law, allowed for some of the most far-
reaching corporate scandals in modern times. 77 Yet, neither federal
nor state government reform has directly altered the nature of the
relationship. At best, recent reforms alter the corporate-stockholder
relationship indirectly by increasing penalties for abuse of the
relationship. Corporate scandals subsequent to recent legislation
78
suggest that only minimal protection is afforded to stockholders
through the indirect realignment of their relationship with corporate
management.
A new direction should be explored to achieve corporate reform:
realignment of the corporate-stockholder relationship by taking some
of the responsibility for monitoring corporate management from the
government and placing it with stockholders. The effectiveness of
changing this relationship lies in the ability to harness stockholders'
existing incentives. Because stockholders have unique and personal
financial interests at stake in a given corporation, their interests are
best served by protecting the intrinsic value of the individual
corporations in which they hold stock. An approach allowing
stockholders to tighten corporate governance for individual
corporations has the potential to do what modern reform has failed to
do: establish a system of corporate governance that stops corporate
wrongdoing in its infancy before it can destroy a corporation.
Realigning the actual corporate-stockholder relationship will
also internalize the costs of monitoring corporate management to
those persons who decide it is in their best interests to do so.
Internalization of costs would not be a goal of restructuring the
corporate-stockholder relationship, but an added benefit. The real
goal would be to increase the probability of preventing corporate
mismanagement by moving from a model dominated by government
monitoring to a model that includes increased stockholder oversight.
76. Larry CatA Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate
Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 328.




A. Increased Monitoring Through Disclosure and Sharing of
Information
In an article exploring shareholder monitoring of corporate
management, Professor Randall Thomas stated that "two predicates to
effective shareholder monitoring are that dispersed investors have
information about the companies they invest in and that they can
communicate this information to other investors so that they can act
collectively."79  Corporate managers who are hostile toward
stockholders seeking information from the corporation, however, have
too many tools to prevent the disclosure of corporate information.80
Use of these tools exposes the relative inequality in bargaining power
that exists between corporate management and its stockholder
constituency. Although it is necessary and desirable for corporations
to deny stockholder access to some types of information (such as, trade
secrets),81 expanded access to corporate information for stockholders is
a necessary predicate to effective monitoring of corporate
management. Expanded access to corporate records may be achieved
either by enlarging the actual set of documents that a stockholder may
review or by facilitating disclosure of information to stockholders who
have the right to review corporate records. The remainder of this Note
focuses on taking one modest step toward accomplishing the latter
method.
Legislation aimed at realigning the corporate-stockholder
relationship by increasing stockholder access to corporate information
would probably be met with stiff resistance from corporate interest
groups. In order to minimize institutional resistance from such
interest groups, therefore, expanding stockholder access to corporate
information would be best accomplished through the judiciary. Yet,
for the same reasons discussed above, change accomplished via the
judiciary would suffer from the same defects inherent in any common
law doctrine: namely, lack of certainty with regard to the permanence
of changes.82 This concern could be mitigated if the judiciary were to
rest its decision to increase stockholder access to corporate
79. Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by
Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 331 (1996).
80. Id. at 332 (stating that corporate managers "can cut off [shareholder] access to certain
information" when management is hostile to the ideas that shareholders are proposing).
81. Id. at 364 n.177 (noting that an examination of the history of shareholder access to
corporate information makes it clear that "the corporation's interests in preserving trade secrets
and other valuable information from disclosure to competitors suggest that some mechanism
must be incorporated to stop rogue shareholders from blackmailing and harassing the
company").
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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information on the plain meaning of the text of a statute already
designed to allow stockholder access to certain corporate information.
The concern of non-permanency would be mitigated to the extent that
the statutory language employed has not yet been interpreted by the
judiciary.
B. Delaware General Corporate Law Section 220
Delaware General Corporate Law Section 220 ("section 220"),
entitled "Inspection of Books and Records," is the principal statute
with which Delaware's judiciary determines the breadth of a
stockholder's access to corporate information. Section 220 allows
stockholders "to obtain two types of information from recalcitrant
managers: the corporation's stocklist and its books and records."8 3
Access to a stocklist is essential for stockholder-to-stockholder
communication because it is the vehicle that allows stockholders to
identify and communicate with one another; thus, it enables collective
action. Access to books and records is the primary vehicle used by a
stockholder "seeking to uncover corporate mismanagement or fraud
[who] may need access to the company's internal files" to obtain such
information.8 4 Books and records obtained pursuant to section 220 are
vital in enabling stockholders to effectively monitor corporate
management. Indeed, one scholar noted the Supreme Court's
suggestion that "corporate frauds may only be discoverable through
the examination of corporate records by shareholders."8 5
A stockholder in a corporation, however, does not have carte
blanche to inspect all the books or records of a corporation pursuant to
section 220. Stockholders seeking corporate books and records bear
the burden of proving that they are entitled to the documents they
desire to inspect.8 6 "This burden is not insubstantial, and 'mere
curiosity or a desire for a fishing expedition will not suffice."'8 7
Stockholders must demonstrate that they have a "proper purpose" in
order to avail themselves of section 220, which means "a purpose
reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder."88 "In
determining the scope of inspection relief, the overriding principle is
83. Thomas, supra note 79, at 332.
84. Id. at 333.
85. Id. at 333 n.10 (citing Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905)).
86. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031-32 (Del. 1996).
87. Mattes v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., C.A. No. 17775, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47, at
*13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2001) (quoting Sahagen Satellite Tech. Group, LLC. v. Ellipso, Inc., 791
A.2d 794 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
88. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2006).
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that only those records that are 'essential and sufficient' to the
shareholder's purpose will be included in the court-ordered
inspection."8 9  Although courts have used section 220 to allow
independent stockholder investigation into potential mismanagement
in limited circumstances, 90 the judiciary's use of section 220 seems to
be focused on its usefulness in the context of litigation.
Notwithstanding section 220's potential use as a mechanism to
discover and rectify corporate fraud independent of litigation,
Delaware's courts seem to view section 220 as little more than a tool
for drafting a well-pleaded complaint. Delaware's supreme court has
stated that "[s]tockholders have a right to at least a limited inquiry
into books and records when they have established some credible basis
to believe that there has been wrongdoing. In fact, a Section 220
proceeding may serve a salutary mission as a prelude to a derivative
suit."91 Again, section 220's use seems litigation-focused. Section 220
is often referred to as merely a "tool at hand" to be utilized to meet the
heightened pleading requirements of Court of Chancery Rule 23.1,
applicable to derivative actions.92 Delaware courts refer plaintiffs to
section 220 after determining that their pleadings were insufficient
with such frequency that the Supreme Court of Delaware has stated
that it is the public policy of the state "to encourage stockholders to
utilize Section 220 before filing a derivative action . . .,93
The judiciary's hope that section 220 will be utilized to craft
well-pleaded complaints is understandable. Yet, in their exuberance
to see that section 220 is employed to this end, Delaware courts have
inadvertently and unnecessarily limited the scope of its application.
Courts focus too much on its usefulness to solve the problem of
remedying complaints that are not well-pleaded and ignore other
potential uses of section 220 that may be equally as valuable to
stockholders.
The statutory language of section 220 is broad enough to allow
courts to moderate an imbalance in the corporate-stockholder
89. Helmsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d 160, 167 (Del. Ch.
1987) (quoting Neely v. Okla. Publ'g Co., No. 5293 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 1977), reprinted in 3 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 126, 139, 142 (1977)).
90. See, e.g., Nodana Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Brennan, 123 A.2d 243 (Del. 1956)
(affirming a decision granting a stockholder the right to investigate a company's books and
records to uncover potential improprieties of management).
91. Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 571 (Del. 1997) (footnote
omitted).
92. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 448 (Del. Ch. 2004).
93. Freund v. Lucent Techs., C.A. No. 18893, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan.
9, 2003) (citing Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218 (Del. 1996); Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock
Exch., 701 A.2d 70, 78 (Del. 1997)).
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relationship. Just as stockholders have the right to sue a corporation,
they also have the right to sell their stock or to use their voting
power. 94 Relegating the role of section 220 to serve only as a pleading
tool is unnecessarily restrictive because it does not further the
stockholder's rights to sell or vote. Still, even when courts recognize a
stockholder's right to inspect books and records independent of
litigation, the courts fail to recognize the breadth of that interest.
Certainly a stockholder may have an interest in maintaining the value
of his or her investment. Just as certainly, stockholders may
accomplish this by using their power to vote. Courts seem to forget
that stockholders could benefit from using section 220 in a manner
that does not involve the courtroom. If Delaware courts began
construing section 220 in a manner that enabled stockholders to gain
information about corporations so that they could exercise their rights
to sell or vote, section 220 would have greater potential to protect the
value of stockholder investments. It could actually be used as a tool to
stop corporate mismanagement.
C. Would Stockholders Use Section 220 to Monitor Corporate
Managers?
A broader application of section 220 is premised upon the
assumption that stockholders will capitalize on enhancements in their
ability to monitor corporate managers. Today, institutional
stockholders hold a majority of the shares in most large public
companies. 95  "This concentrated ownership gives [institutional
investors] significant potential power over these corporations" and
additional incentive to monitor corporate management. 96 Still, recent
scholarship casts doubt on the ability, and perhaps the desire, of
institutional investors to become "corporate watchdogs." A major
reason for this is that they may "not want the constraints that would
undoubtedly come with an increased role in managerial monitoring."97
One example of a constraint that an institutional investor may want
to avoid is the potential of being labeled an insider which would
preclude it from freely trading on a corporation's stock. Although this
94. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 215,
215-16.
95. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67, 91 n.52 (2003) ("[I]nstitutions own
approximately sixty-six percent of the outstanding shares of S&P 500 companies as of January
2003.").
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id. at 78.
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notion has analytical weight, many institutional investors invest in
corporations with views towards the long-term performance of a
corporation's stock,98 rebutting the notion that liquidity is a major
concern.
Institutional investors that hold their investments for long-
term gains can only be made better off by expanded access to
corporate information. Greater access increases their ability to
monitor corporate management. The fact that some institutional
investors value the liquidity of a portion of their holdings is no excuse
to deny all institutional investors expanded access to corporate books
and records. Critics may also point to the historical reluctance of
institutional stockholders to perform monitoring activities 99 as
evidence that these stockholders are not interested in, or capable of,
an increased monitoring role. Such criticism, however, is inherently
flawed-it is much like looking at a dog in a cage and concluding that
the dog does not want to get out because it is not actively trying to
break free. While some dogs may be happy to stay in their cages,
others forego the wasted energy of attempting to break out because
they are smart enough to realize they are hopelessly boxed in.
Understanding the restraints that currently bind stockholders who
seek to monitor corporate management could explain their perceived
reluctance to monitor corporate management. A particularly strong
restraint placed on stockholders relates to inter-stockholder
communication.
Improvement in the way that stockholders communicate with
each other is not easy to achieve. In fact, there have been no real
changes since 1992, when "the SEC adopted a wide range of proxy
rules and other amendments designed to enhance shareholder
communications, both amongst shareholders and between
shareholders and companies." 100  The SEC's changes have had a
limited impact on stockholder communications.10 1 The lack of further
innovation to increase the ability of institutional stockholders to
communicate with one another, especially with respect to sharing
information obtained pursuant to section 220, could explain the
98. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 468 n.73 (1991).
99. Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate
Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 147 (1998) (stating that institutional
investors rarely use the avenues available to them to affect the governance of corporations,
especially to replace a board of directors).
100. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 95, at 91.
101. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1992) (stating that




reluctance of institutional investors to involve themselves in
monitoring corporate management. Without the ability to share
information discovered pursuant to section 220 with other
stockholders, investors are often left powerless to effectuate changes
necessary to rectify corporate wrongdoing if it is discovered.
If an institutional investor obtains information pursuant to
section 220 that would be useful in making a determination that a
certain board member should be replaced, that investor is placed in a
difficult position under the current framework. Unless that single
investor holds a majority of the voting power in the corporation, the
investor must be able to communicate that information to other
stockholders in order for the information to be of value. In the
absence of a mechanism allowing such communication, the incentives
of a stockholder to monitor corporate management are eviscerated and
a stockholder's best option may be to sell his or her investment in a
corporation upon discovery of the mismanagement. Yet, inability to
sell one's stock attaches once one acquires material inside
information.102 Furthermore, an institutional investor may also have
pecuniary disincentives to dump large blocks of stock in a short period
of time because such action may trigger a fire-sale, which will in turn
diminish the value of its holdings in the company that it was unable to
sell initially.
Significant restrictions on the ability of stockholders, including
institutional stockholders, to communicate information obtained from
a corporation with each other prevent effective corporate monitoring.
These restrictions are an unnecessary obstacle built into our system of
corporate governance that tilts the balance in the corporate-
stockholder relationship too far in management's favor. The
remainder of this Note will suggest one way in which our system of
corporate governance may be reformed in order to realign a portion of
the corporate-stockholder relationship by removing barriers to certain
stockholder communication.
IV. DELAWARE'S OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE STOCKHOLDER
MONITORING
Increased stockholder access to corporate records and increased
stockholder input in management functions is by no means a novel
102. See Lacey S. Calhoun, Moving Toward a Clearer Definition of Insider Trading: Why
Adoption of the Possession Standard Protects Investors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1119, 1121
(1999) (reviewing when liability attaches under SEC Rule 10b-5 and stating that "an insider
selling stock in his corporation is liable under the possession standard [of 10b-5] if he is shown
simply to have possessed material inside information at the time of [a] trade").
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solution to reforming our system of corporate governance. 103 In fact,
one recent rule proposal by the SEC 10 4 contemplated increased
stockholder input by including board election contests in a
corporation's proxy. 10 5 This proposal was met with stiff resistance.
After the SEC announced the proposed change, the public commenting
period was dominated by negative input from powerful lobbying
forces.10 6 Commentators also mostly disapproved. 10 7 Major arguments
against allowing stockholders to hold election contests through a
company's proxy include: (1) costs to the corporation (both temporal
and pecuniary) associated with contested elections; (2) deterrence of
qualified individuals from serving on boards; (3) questionable
character and qualifications of stockholder nominees; and (4) the
possibility of "balkanizing" the board.'08 Though allowing for board
election contests is analytically distinct from allowing section 220 to
be used in conjunction with a proxy solicitation, the structural
similarity between the two proposed reforms means that some of the
criticisms leveled against the proposed rules change may also be
leveled against the proposal outlined in this Note.
Proposals seeking to achieve corporate governance reform
through a realignment of the corporate-stockholder relationship
should be structured to avoid costing corporations on their bottom line
and eroding the quality or effectiveness of board members. In light of
these concerns, one way to achieve corporate governance reform is by
providing corporate stockholders with a tool allowing them to
communicate with each other during the proxy solicitation process.
Such a tool could be used to share information gleaned from a
corporation as a result of a stockholder's right to inspect the books and
103. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 79, at 331 (focusing on reforming inspection statutes,
especially for institutional shareholders); John A. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate
Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (discussing ways to reform the structure of corporate
governance so as to include shareholder input into important management functions).
104. Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (proposed
Oct. 14, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, and 274), available at http://www.sec.gov
rules/proposed /34-48626.htm.
105. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 95, at 67.
106. See, e.g., Letter from Jerry W. Powell, Compass Bancshares Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz,
Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/compass
banc122203.htm (last visited May 31, 2006); Letter from Michael J. Holliday, N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm. (June 13, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/s71003/scrblsnysba061303.htm (last visited May 31, 2006).
107. See Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting
Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 254, 267 (2004) (collecting and discussing the
major criticisms of the proposal).
108. See id.
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records of a corporation under section 220. A recent case from the
Chancery Court of Delaware provided the judiciary with an
opportunity to realign this very narrow aspect of the corporate-
stockholder relationship in exactly such a manner.10 9 Unfortunately,
when faced with an opportunity to shift the balance of the corporate-
stockholder equilibrium, the Court of Chancery decided to make it
even more difficult for stockholder constituencies to prevent corporate
wrongdoing through the use of section 220.
A. Disney Case Study
In a branch of the well-known Disney litigation1 ("Disney"),
Delaware's Chancery Court was presented with a plaintiffs request to
apply section 220 in a slightly non-traditional manner." Roy E.
Disney, the plaintiff, was unhappy with certain decisions made by the
board of directors with respect to the severance package given to
Disney's former president, Michael Ovitz. 11 2 Out of his concern over
the severance package, Mr. Disney sought access to corporate books
and records pursuant to section 220 "to investigate possible
mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, improper influence or
conduct, improper conflicts of interest between directors and officers
and the Compensation Committee and lack of due care." 113 Although
the Walt Disney Company did not object to Mr. Disney's purpose for
seeking the requested information, it insisted "that Mr. Disney agree
to a form of confidentiality agreement that would permit the Company
to designate broad categories of non-public information as
'confidential' and would prohibit [him] from publicly disseminating
any 'confidential' information."11 4 This prohibition was categorical and
applied to the general public and stockholders alike.
Mr. Disney objected to the breadth of the proposed
confidentiality agreement and initiated litigation when the parties
could not agree on its scope.115 Thereafter, the parties came to an
understanding "that did not limit the Company's ability to designate
documents as 'confidential,"' but "permitted Mr. Disney to challenge
the Company's designations" in the Court of Chancery if the parties
109. In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
110. Id.
111. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 445 (Del. Ch. 2004).
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id.
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could not resolve their disagreements. 116  Acquiescing to this
confidentiality agreement was the only way that Mr. Disney could
obtain access to Disney's books and records without continuing
lengthy and costly litigation focused on the scope of the confidentiality
agreement.
Not surprisingly, prior to Mr. Disney's inspection, the Disney
Company designated nearly two hundred of the six hundred pages it
produced pursuant to section 220 as "confidential."'1 17 Items which
were deemed confidential included "performance evaluations,
documents reflecting the board's deliberative process and non-public
financial targets established for a tax-qualified compensation plan."118
Mr. Disney objected to the company's designation of many of these
documents as confidential. To obtain relief, he applied to the Court of
Chancery which ruled that Mr. Disney was not entitled to relief from
the confidentiality agreement.11 9 While reviewing Mr. Disney's case
the court purportedly set out a new standard for reviewing claims for
"relief from a Section 220 confidentiality agreement in the context of
an active proxy solicitation."120 After stating that the court was not
aware of a decision discussing the standard to apply in such a
situation, the court stated:
[1]t can be assumed that the burden on the [party seeking to cancel the confidentiality
agreement] would be heavy. For example, the person seeking relief will be required to
show a likelihood that disclosure of information designated "confidential" is needed to
prevent the corporation's proxy materials from being false and misleading in some
material respect, or equally compelling circumstances. 
1 2 1
In pronouncing this standard, the Chancery Court essentially
held that a stockholder seeking to cancel a confidentiality agreement
entered into pursuant to section 220 must meet a burden strikingly
similar to the one applied to stockholders who seek to penalize a
corporation for violation of Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("Rule 14a-9" or "14a-9").1 22 Rule 14a-9 states that no proxy
solicitation shall be made which is "false or misleading with respect to
any material fact .... 123 In essence, the court decided that for a
stockholder to share information obtained pursuant to section 220




119. Id. at 449.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-a-9 (2006).
123. Id.
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presumably entitled to the same information, the stockholder must
first show that the information obtained pursuant to section 220 is
sufficient to prove a violation of securities law.
The Disney court announced a tremendously strict standard for
canceling a section 220 confidentiality agreement to share information
during an active proxy solicitation. As such, it missed an opportunity
to achieve meaningful reform to our system of corporate governance by
failing to move the corporate-stockholder relationship into more of a
balanced state. Moreover, the court ignored the potential role of
institutional investors ii today's market and their ability to serve as a
check on corporate mismanagement if able to effectively communicate
with one another.
B. Rule 14a-9s Application to Section 220 Confidentiality Agreements
Rule 14a-9 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states, in
part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement. . containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading ....
Under this rule, the corporation, as the issuer of the proxy, is
directly liable for materially misleading proxy statements. 124  A
statement is considered material if "there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote."'1 25 "Individual directors can also be liable personally if
they participated sufficiently" in drafting the proxy statement. 126 To
recover damages under 14a-9, a plaintiff must make a very difficult
showing of causation: the misleading statement in the proxy must
"link[] a directors' proposal with the votes legally required to authorize
the action proposed."'127
There are at least two major problems with applying the 14a-9
standard to a stockholder seeking to cancel a confidentiality
agreement entered into pursuant to section 220. First, doing so
restricts the scope of what a stockholder may share with another
stockholder to information related to what the corporation included
124. Gould v. Am. Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 998 (D. Del. 1971).
125. See TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
126. Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (citing Salit v.
Stanley Works, 802 F. Supp. 728, 733 (D. Conn. 1992); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d
987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988)).
127. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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within its proxy statement. In other words, because the corporation
controls what it puts in its proxy, the corporation would also control
when a stockholder could use information obtained pursuant to
section 220 to alert other stockholders to corporate wrongdoing.
Second, due to the remedial framework of 14a-9, the standard simply
does not allow a stockholder to disseminate information he or she
knows is misleading to other stockholders before they are deceived by
a misleading proxy statement.
There are a host of issues a stockholder could uncover pursuant
to section 220 which would never find their way into a corporation's
proxy statement because the subject matter is simply not pertinent to
a stockholder vote. The power to set compensation levels,128 among
other things,129 is within the authority of the board of directors and is
generally not subject to stockholder approval. Mishandling of
activities that do not require stockholder approval may be relevant to
a stockholder's decision to exercise his right to elect certain board
members or acquiesce to a proxy solicitation. Because information
germane to board actions, which do not require a stockholder vote,
would not appear on a proxy solicitation, applying a 14a-9-like
standard is inapposite. Since corporations have total control over the
subject matter of a proxy solicitation, they can dictate when and if
potentially negative information uncovered via section 220 will be
disseminated to other stockholders. For example, if a corporation
solicited proxies for an election of its board of directors, and, pursuant
to section 220, a stockholder uncovered negative information about a
board member's actions, the corporation could effectively block
dissemination of that information by refusing to include in the proxy a
misleading statement related to the wrongdoing. Under the
framework set up in Disney, the information could not be disclosed to
other stockholders through cancellation of a confidentiality agreement
because the information would not satisfy 14a-9's requirements. This
would be true even if the negative information were undisputed by the
corporation.
Another reason why a 14a-9-like standard should not be
applied to section 220 confidentiality agreements lies in a fatal
procedural deficiency. On its face, rule 14a-9 is remedial in nature1 30
and gives stockholders an implied cause of action against corporate
128. Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359 (Del. Ch. 1983) (stating that "generally directors have
the sole authority to determine compensation levels and this determination is protected by the
presumption of the business judgment rule") (citations omitted).
129. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122-123 (2006) (setting forth general and
specific powers of a corporation).
130. TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 448.
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managers or boards of directors when these managers or directors use
their positions to issue false or misleading proxy statements. 14a-9 is
a tool fashioned with the express purpose of remedying damages
already caused by a false or misleading proxy solicitation. As a
pragmatic reality, any remedial tool is incapable of preventing harm
prospectively. Although a stockholder could possibly obtain an
injunction to stop a proxy solicitation after he had received it, this
would require litigation. Worse still, the 14a-9-like standard leaves
stockholders powerless to stop the dissemination of false information
because they have no opportunity to review a corporation's proxy
statement before it is sent to stockholders.
The court in Disney did not elaborate on the possible
justifications for the stringent standard of review applied when
stockholders seek to cancel a confidentiality agreement entered into
pursuant to section 220 in the context of an active proxy solicitation.
Application of the standard seems to be based on several false
premises. First, it seems that the court applied general contract
principles which require mutual agreement on the part of the
contractors in order to modify a contract. 131 Although the rule is
sound in the abstract, it ignores the realities stockholders face when
entering confidentiality agreements pursuant to section 220.
As the Disney case illustrates, stockholders often enter into
confidentiality agreements as a result of a gross imbalance in
bargaining power. 132  Stockholders acquiesce to overbroad
confidentiality agreements because without entering a confidentiality
agreement, corporations may deny access to the records altogether,
unless stockholders sue to enforce such a right. Asymmetrical
information between a corporation and its stockholders works against
a stockholder's willingness to spend the time and money necessary to
bring litigation. The corporation possesses all company information
and is therefore best able to judge the relative value of that
information. Consequently, corporations can accurately estimate
what it is worth to protect certain information and make litigation
decisions accordingly. Corporations naturally will refuse to allow
inspection of books and records under section 220 unless a stockholder
acquiesces to a confidentiality agreement broad enough to allay any
concerns the corporation may have about revealing potentially
131. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on
Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (1997) ("The prerogative of contractors to
modify their original contract by mutual agreement is an article of faith for contract law.").
132. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 446 (Del. Ch. 2004) (detailing Mr. Disney's




damaging information. Thus, corporations may conceal information
that reveals corporate mismanagement by constraining the
dissemination of such information to other stockholders. Essentially,
confidentiality agreements force each individual stockholder to incur
the costs of discovering the information.
If a stockholder cannot share information obtained via section
220 with other stockholders so as to bring about collective action, the
stockholders' power to use their vote to make changes to a corporation
is nullified; the stockholders' only remaining options are to sue or sell
their holdings in the corporation. The high burden Disney placed on a
stockholder seeking to cancel a confidentiality agreement entered into
pursuant to section 220 will discourage stockholders from correcting
problems they may discover within a corporation and encourages
these same investors to simply sell their stock to other investors.
Such a course of action allows corporate mismanagement to continue
unchecked even after its discovery.
It is true that a stockholder may litigate the scope of the
confidentiality agreement, but the costs of such litigation serve as a
natural deterrent to such action.133 This is especially true because the
stockholder does not know what information may or may not be
available for inspection. But, as the court stated in Disney, a court
determining whether a confidentiality agreement should be honored
will "begin[] its analysis with the presumption that the production of
nonpublic corporate books and records to a stockholder making a
demand pursuant to section 220 should be conditioned upon a
reasonable confidentiality order."134
Although the presumption is a sound one, the court in Disney
seems to start from the presumption that the confidentiality
agreement was reasonable, rather than the presumption that the
agreement should be reasonable. 135 This ignores the reality of the
stockholder's choice when entering the agreement: agree to the
corporation's terms or face the costs of litigation. As such, if
stockholders agree to a confidentiality agreement without first
litigating its scope, they run the risk of a court treating the
confidentiality agreement as if it were a contract entered into willingly
by equal parties. Just as the court did in Disney, a court may start
with the presumption that the confidentiality agreement is reasonable
and consequently require the party seeking to cancel the contract to
justify the cancellation. Such a standard of review allows corporations
133. Id. at 449.
134. Id. at 447.
135. See id. at 449.
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to benefit from their greater bargaining power and full access to
asymmetric information and works against collective action. Again,
"two predicates to effective shareholder monitoring are that dispersed
investors have information about the companies they invest in and
that they can communicate this information to other investors so that
they can act collectively."'136 When a 14a-9-like standard is applied to
determine whether a section 220 confidentiality agreement can be
cancelled, the latter predicate is undermined and collective action is
made nearly impossible without resorting to litigation. In establishing
this standard, the court in Disney ignored section 220's capacity to
move toward a system of corporate governance where stockholders
have the ability to monitor corporate governance.
C. An Alternative View of Section 220 Confidentiality Agreements
As noted above, when a court reviews a confidentiality
agreement entered into under section 220 in the context of an active
proxy solicitation, the court presumes the agreement was entered into
pursuant to a reasonable confidentiality order. 137 A court could just as
easily presume that a corporation's protection from dissemination of
non-public information will not be diminished if a stockholder shares
information obtained pursuant to section 220 with other stockholders
in certain situations. For example, if the stockholder who obtains
information pursuant to section 220 shares that information only with
similarly situated stockholders agreeing to be bound by the same
confidentiality agreement, the corporation's protection should not be
compromised. This is so because similarly situated stockholders
possess the same pecuniary incentives to prevent corporate
mismanagement. In effect, a court could read an implied waiver into
the confidentiality agreement entered into by the corporation, which is
justified because a corporation should not be able to treat similarly
situated stockholders differently with respect to the dissemination of
section 220 information. Determining if one stockholder is similarly
situated to another, then, would become a task of great importance.
There are various measurements a court could use to
determine whether one stockholder is similarly situated to another.
Most obviously, a court could compare the amount or value of stock
that each stockholder possesses. If the stockholders possess an
amount within a specified range, the court could conclude that they
are similarly situated. Another way for a court to determine which
136. Thomas, supra note 79, at 331.
137. Disney, 857 A.2d at 449.
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stockholders should be able to enter the same confidentiality
agreement would be by setting an ownership floor-a minimum
amount of stock a party must own to be privy to any information
obtained pursuant to section 220. An additional requirement could be
comparison of the ratio of the value that the stock in question
represents to each stockholder's entire portfolio of assets. This
requirement would ensure that large institutional investors whose
stake in a given corporation may be insignificant as to them actually
possess similar pecuniary incentives as the stockholder who entered
into the original confidentiality agreement pursuant to section 220.
As an alternative to reading an implied waiver into a
confidentiality agreement, courts could conclude that any
confidentiality agreement which does not contain a clause allowing for
stockholders to share information obtained pursuant to section 220
with similarly situated investors (who are willing to enter the same
confidentiality agreement) is sufficient evidence, or at the very least
strong evidence, to rebut the presumption that the agreement was
reasonable. 138  A court that took this approach would give the
stockholder a better chance to prevail in a suit to set aside a
confidentiality agreement entered into pursuant to section 220. This
approach makes more sense than presuming that all section 220
confidentiality agreements are reasonable because it takes into
account the inequality in bargaining power inherent in the corporate-
stockholder relationship.
Trade secrets, corporate strategies, management practices, and
the like are all important pieces of information that could damage a
corporation if parties inimical to the well being of the corporation were
to obtain them. None of these interests would be implicated by a
stockholder sharing evidence of corporate mismanagement obtained
pursuant to section 220 with another stockholder during an active
proxy solicitation for the purpose of collective action against a board
member. Allowing increased stockholder communication during an
active proxy solicitation would be an extremely powerful tool in the
hands of stockholders because it would allow them to withhold votes
from board members who are implicated in mismanagement. Such a
change would transform section 220 from a means of drafting a well-
pleaded complaint into a tool useful to stop corporate mismanagement
when it is discovered and to prevent it from perpetuating.
138. Id. at 449 (stating that courts begin their review of requests to set confidentiality




Our current system of corporate governance is in need of
reform. Current legal scholarship is focused on reforming our system
through reliance on (1) Delaware's judiciary or legislature, or (2) a
new system of corporate federalism. Such avenues of reform are less
efficient than those that empower corporate stockholders to root out
corporate wrongdoing. One way of empowering stockholders would be
to change the standard of review applied when a stockholder seeks to
share information obtained pursuant to section 220 with other
stockholders during an active proxy solicitation. Because such a
change would involve overturning only one portion of a recent judicial
opinion, implementing the reform is pragmatic and somewhat
insulated from the political pressures applied to Delaware's
governmental institutions. Further, such a move has the potential to
shift the balance in the corporate-stockholder relationship to achieve a
system that more closely resembles an equilibrium, in turn possibly
preventing corporate wrongdoing before it destroys a corporation.
Delaware should empower stockholders to police corporate
management by allowing stockholders to share information obtained
pursuant to section 220 with other stockholders during an active
proxy solicitation if the stockholders are: (1)similarly situated and (2)
agree to enter the same confidentiality agreement with the
corporation as the stockholder who petitioned the corporation for
access to books and records under section 220. This change would
help prevent corporate malfeasance by enabling stockholders to
monitor corporate management and share information with other
stockholders when it matters most-when a stockholder is about to
yield their voting rights to another party. It is precisely during an
active proxy solicitation, where collective action is most likely to occur,
that our system of corporate governance should encourage
dissemination of information to stockholders to which they are
statutorily entitled.
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